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The Kochs, who operate through their own aptly named Americans for 
Prosperity, a dark money group their network of super-rich allies also contribute to, 
have said that they plan to spend a humongous $889 million in the 2016 campaign—
all of it dark money, so the public won’t know who made the contributions. This 
makes the Kochs virtually a political party of their own. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Lawrence Lessig has made a great contribution to American public life 
by drawing attention to the influence of money in politics through his writing, 
                                                           
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This Article is an expansion and 
developments of remarks given on a symposium panel sponsored by the Cleveland State Law 
Review on Friday, April 17, 2015, entitled “Power of the Purse: The Influence of Money in 
Today’s Political Regime.” That symposium preceded a keynote address by Professor 
Lawrence Lessig on the topic, “How Money (in politics) Matters.” This Article also in part 
responds to Professor Lessig’s talk. The Article was prepared with the support of the 
Duquesne Law School Summer Research Writing Program. 
 1 Elizabeth Drew, How Money Runs Our Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jun/04/how-money-runs-our-politics. 
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speaking, and organizing. His best-selling book, Republic Lost,2 has galvanized a 
movement demanding serious campaign finance reform. I agree with the broad 
outline of his concern about the dependence of Congress on wealthy individuals and 
entities and the political corruption that this pecuniary dependence entails. 
So, it is with hesitation that I set out in this Article my reservations concerning 
Professor Lessig’s analysis of the problem of money. Money does not play quite the 
dominant role in our politics that he suggests. Money by itself does not select 
nominees or elect candidates or enact policy.   
Moreover, Professor Lessig’s analysis overlooks the unique threat that 
independent political spending poses to American democracy. It is independent 
spending, rather than money in general, that threatens to undermine the nature of 
elections. Independent spending takes away debates and decisions from candidates 
and voters and empowers organizations that are, because of non-coordination 
requirements, independent and politically irresponsible. To deal with this immediate 
threat, I propose the elimination of all contribution limits to candidates for office, 
which would greatly inhibit independent spending. The Article opens in Part I with 
the legal history and current status of independent political spending. Then, in Part 
II, the Article shows how independent spending threatens democracy more 
fundamentally than does the influence of money in general. Part III outlines my plan 
to limit independent spending, which consists of the simple expedient of eliminating 
campaign contribution limits and addresses some of the concerns that arise from the 
resulting regime of unlimited direct campaign contributions. Finally, in Part IV, I 
return to Professor Lessig’s program of campaign finance reform and suggest that 
eliminating contribution limits would actually advance that program. 
I consider this Article to be a mostly friendly amendment to the Lessig reform 
agenda. Nevertheless, that reform agenda is too diffuse. Without immediate attention 
to the specific threat of independent political spending, American democracy will 
continue to erode, whatever other reforms are enacted. 
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL SPENDING 
The term independent political spending refers to money spent in support of the 
election of a candidate for political office that, by law, cannot be coordinated with 
the campaign activities organized by that candidate.3 Such spending can be 
positive—that is, touting the attributes of a candidate or getting out the vote on her 
                                                           
 2 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN 
TO STOP IT (2011). 
 3 I use the terms independent political spending and independent spending 
interchangeably. There are currently two major forms of independent spending: Super PACs, 
a new type of PAC created after Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc), was decided, technically independent expenditure-only committees, and 501(c)(4) and 
501(c)(6) organizations, called politically active nonprofit organizations. See Political 
Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS.ORG,, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2016); 
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG,, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2016). Money spent on behalf of ballot questions and other forms of political 
decision-making is beyond the scope of this Article, but is generally protected from 
government regulation. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 
298-99 (1981) (striking down contribution limits to a referendum campaign as far removed 
from the potential for candidate corruption). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/5
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behalf—but is often negative, attacking a favored candidate’s opponents. Disclosing 
the sources of independent spending may or may not be required.4 When the sources 
of independent spending are not disclosed, the spending is often called “dark 
money.”5 While individuals can engage in independent spending on their own, the 
vast majority of such spending is undertaken by nonprofit organizations, often 
created to further the electoral prospects of a single candidate, usually in one election 
cycle. Organizations engaged in independent spending can receive unlimited 
donations from corporations, individuals, and unions.6  
Independent political spending did not exist in any important sense before 1976. 
Prior to that, candidates and political parties controlled spending in American 
political campaigns.7 Independent political spending arose because of the particular 
holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.8 
A. The Supreme Court’s Role in Independent Political Spending 
Buckley held that, under the First Amendment, the only government interest that 
could justify restrictions on political contributions or political spending was 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.9 The Court held that there 
was no compelling government interest in reducing the influence of wealth by 
leveling the playing field to equalize the influence of individuals and groups.10 In 
practical terms, these holdings meant that government could, to an extent, regulate 
contributions to candidates, but could not regulate spending on behalf of candidates, 
whether from a candidate’s personal funds or by individuals independent of a 
campaign.   
The Buckley framework of limiting contributions but failing to limit independent 
spending, survives to this day. The only significant change in defining permissible 
campaign finance regulation since Buckley was the holding in Citizens United v. 
FEC that corporations enjoy First Amendment protections similar to those of 
                                                           
 4 See Bradley A. Smith, Disclosure in a Post-Citizens United Real World, 6 U. ST. 
THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 268 (2012). For example, Super PACs must report their 
donors to the Federal Election Commission on a monthly or quarterly basis, while politically 
active nonprofits do not have to disclose the sources of their funding. Of course, there are 
loopholes to disclosure, such as nonprofit contributions to Super PACs that can effectively 
shield the real sources of funds. Id. 
 5 See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 3. The Supreme Court held in 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370-71 (2010), that corporations could be required to 
disclose their independent political spending, but it is not clear that the law has kept up with 
the evolving phenomenon of independent spending.  
 6 Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 3. 
 7 In fact, independent spending did not really take off until the twenty-first century. See 
Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & 
POL. 683, 683 (2012). 
 8 424 U.S. 1 (per curiam). 
 9 Id. at 25-28. 
 10 Id. at 48-49.  
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individuals, and thus are protected in using general treasury funds to engage in 
independent spending on behalf of candidates.11    
The modern phenomenon of independent political spending was born at the point 
of this juxtaposition of contribution limits without spending limits. A person who 
supports the election of a candidate can only contribute a certain amount of money 
directly to that candidate.12 Therefore, if that person wants to spend more money 
supporting a candidate than contribution limits permit, the only way to do so is to 
spend money directly, by, for example, creating advertising supporting the 
candidate’s election. Non-coordination regulations, which prohibit coordination 
between independent political spending and campaign spending, ensures that 
independent spending is not a disguised, prohibited campaign contribution.13   
The continuity of the Buckley framework masked a disagreement among the 
Justices over the meaning of the corruption that the government might permissibly 
seek to prevent. In 2003, in McConnell v. FEC, the Court interpreted the government 
interest in preventing corruption to include not just the quid pro quo corruption of 
vote buying, but “the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or 
the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have 
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”14 This expansive 
understanding of corruption, which is the understanding of corruption ardently 
supported by Professor Lessig,15 could support not only limits on campaign 
contributions, but limits on independent spending as well.   
In light of the possibility of restricting independent spending, the real 
significance of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United was not its 
holding regarding corporations, but his quotation from his dissent in McConnell, 
rejecting any approach to corruption broader than the prevention of quid pro quo 
vote buying.16 Justice Kennedy held expressly for the Court in Citizens United that 
quid pro quo vote buying corruption could not justify a restriction on independent 
spending because such spending is not coordinated with a candidate’s campaign, 
and, therefore, could not yield quid pro quo corruption.17 This narrow conception of 
corruption now seems fully entrenched on the Court.18   
                                                           
 11 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19, 370-71 (2010). 
 12 See FED. ELEC. COMM’N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2015-2015 FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 13 The Court in Buckley upheld treating coordinated expenditures as if they were 
contributions to a candidate – and thus permitting restrictions on the amount of coordinated 
spending – but struck down similar treatment for expenditures “made totally independently of 
the candidate and his campaign.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. 
 14 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003). 
 15 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 226-47. 
 16 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 17 Id. at 360. 
 18 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42 (2014). At the Cleveland State Law 
Review 2015 Symposium, Professor Lessig expressed confidence that Justice Kagan would 
lead the Supreme Court toward a new conception of corruption that would permit government 
regulation of independent political spending. Professor Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at 
 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/5
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B. The Effect of Constitutionally-Protected Independent Spending on American 
Politics  
Before the current election cycle, one could point to three effects of independent 
spending on American politics: independent spending could (1) mask the sources of 
monetary support for a candidate, (2) increase the overall amount of spending on 
behalf of that candidate and (3) allow campaign activities, such as negative 
advertising, to go forward without the candidate’s accountability. Of these effects, 
this Article is mainly concerned with the political irresponsibility that corresponds 
with the third effect. It is the independence of independent spending that threatens 
democracy in America. 
The other two effects have not been significant by themselves. In terms of 
masking the sources of independent spending, the media has sometimes ferreted out 
such sources, even when attempts have been made at hiding them.19 The real 
problem has been getting the public to care. The independence of this spending 
shields candidates from paying a political price for their dependence on unpopular 
funders.   
In terms of the amount of money that independent spending provides, it is not 
clear how much of that money would be donated anyway—in the form of 
contributions to candidates—if independent spending were ended. There is a lot of 
independent spending. For example, in the 2014 Alaska Senate race, the candidates 
together spent less than $20 million,20 while outside groups spent around $40 
million.21 If, however, the sheer amount of money spent is a concern, that concern is 
unrelated to the independence of the spending. Someone worried about the expense 
of politics is presumably concerned about the amount, not the form, of the spending, 
as demonstrated by the fact that $60 million was spent on the Alaska Senate race in 
2014. 
In contrast to transparency and overall expense, the ability of independent 
spending to shield candidates from responsibility for actions taken on their behalf 
has actually changed how political campaigns are run and perhaps even has affected 
                                                           
the Cleveland State Law Review Symposium: Power of the Purse: The Influence of Money in 
Today’s Political Regime (Apr. 17, 2015). At the moment, it appears that any such change 
will have to await a change in membership on the Court. 
 19 See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Courts Shine Light on Dark Money, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (May 26, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/courts-shine-light-dark-
money. Actually, for purposes of transparency, the specific sources might not even matter. For 
example, two important sources of dark money in the North Carolina 2014 legislative races 
were the Natural Resources Defense Council and the American Petroleum Institute. See Alex 
Kotch, Outside Political Groups Spent $10M in NC in 2014, Favored GOP, INST. FOR 
SOUTHERN STUD. (Mar. 12, 2015, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.southernstudies.org/2015/03/outside-political-groups-spent-10m-in-nc-in-2014-
f.html. What more could voters learn about the nature of these influences that their very names 
do not tell them?    
 20 See Alaska Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?id=aks1&cycle=2014 (last visited Jan. 25, 
2016).   
 21 See 2014 Outside Spending, by Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2014&disp=R&pty=A&type=
A (last visited Dec 9, 2015).    
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candidates’ chances for victory. Two celebrated examples illustrate the point. In the 
2004 presidential election campaign, a group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth 
raised politically damaging questions about the Vietnam War service record of 
Democratic candidate John Kerry, who had been emphasizing his military record in 
contrast to that of President George Bush.22 In the view of many observers, the 
campaign against Kerry was inaccurate, which has given rise to the phrase 
“swiftboating” to describe false political attacks on a candidate.23 For purposes of 
this Article, the importance of this episode lies in the response to it and the 
requirement of non-coordination of independent spending.24 When the swiftboat ads 
first appeared, Republican Senator John McCain, himself a veteran of the Vietnam 
War, called on the Bush campaign to condemn the ads.25 Instead, the Bush campaign 
released a statement that pointed out it was not the Bush campaign that was 
challenging Kerry’s military record.26 Kerry was dismissive of this response, 
insisting that Bush wanted the Swift Boat group “to do his dirty work.”27 President 
Bush was pressed on the issue, but responded with a call for an end to all 
independent spending and urged Senator Kerry to do the same.28 It is unclear what 
such an agreement about independent spending by the candidates could accomplish, 
given the non-coordination requirement. 
Without addressing the issues of ties between the Bush campaign and the Swift 
Boat group, or the extent of actual, and thus illegal, coordination, it is clear that 
without independent spending, the legitimacy of Kerry’s military record would either 
not have arisen—the Bush campaign was obviously loathe to raise the issue—or 
President Bush would have been forced to defend or condemn the attacks. It was the 
independence of the ad campaign that allowed President Bush to benefit from 
questionable political tactics on his behalf, for which he could then deny all 
responsibility. 
                                                           
 22 See Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, 2004 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527events.php?id=61 (last visited Dec 9, 2015). 
 23 See MELISSA M. SMITH ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE POLITICAL SHELL 
GAME 105 (2010). 
 24 The group Swift Boat Veterans for Truth was organized under section 527 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which exempts from taxation “issue advocacy” nonprofit 
organizations that are also prohibited from coordination with candidates and campaigns. See 
Benjamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash: Evaluating the 
FEC's New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006). 
 25 See McCain Deplores Anti-Kerry Ads, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2004, 1:51 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5612836/ns/politics/t/mccain-deplores-anti-kerry-
ad/#.Vj0E7LSTr8F. 
 26 See Bush Urges Immediate End to ‘Soft Money’ Ads, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/aug/5/20040805-115811-6900r/?page=all (“‘We 
have not and we will not question Senator Kerry's service in Vietnam,’ White House 
spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters aboard Air Force One.”). 
 27 Jodi Wilgoren, Fed Up, Kerry Says Bush Lets Group ‘Do His Dirty Work,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/us/fed-up-kerry-says-bush-lets-group-
do-his-dirty-work.html.  
 28 See Larry King Live: Interview with George W. Bush, Laura Bush, CNN (Aug. 12, 
2004), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0408/12/lkl.00.html. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/5
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The swift boat lesson from 2004, that independent spending could insulate a 
candidate from responsibility for controversial attacks on an opponent, was 
dramatically reinforced in the 2012 Republican presidential primary campaign. As 
told by Paul Blumenthal at the Huffington Post, the main beneficiary of the 
irresponsibility of independent spending was the ultimate winner of the Republican 
nomination, Mitt Romney: 
A similar notoriety has come to define Restore Our Future, the pro-
Romney super PAC. The group has been nicknamed the "Death Star" by 
the media for its emulation of the "Star Wars" movie menace: Instead of 
planets, Restore Our Future zeros in on Romney's closest competitors and 
eviscerates them with negative ads. 
“In state after state, whoever has popped up on the Republican side 
has been the recipient of very hard-hitting attacks,” West29 said. “It's not 
just the negativity, but a lot of the attacks have been misleading or take 
things out of context.” 
In December, when Gingrich surged to a huge lead in the national 
polls ahead of the Jan. 3 Iowa caucuses, Restore Our Future began an 
unprecedented assault. Its ads brought up Gingrich's climate change 
efforts with Democrats Nancy Pelosi and Al Gore, his work for Freddie 
Mac, the non-lobbying lobbying he did for health care companies and the 
$300,000 penalty levied on him for congressional ethics rules violations. 
Gingrich collapsed in the polls as the Iowa contest approached. 
After Gingrich bested Romney in the South Carolina primary on Jan. 
21 and surged again into the national lead, Romney’s super PAC ally 
spent $10.9 million across Florida—the biggest negative campaign waged 
in one state by an independent group in primary history. Gingrich was 
swamped by the negative ads and lost badly in the Sunshine State.30 
Although it was always clear that Romney was associated with these efforts, the 
ferocity and effectiveness of the negative campaign would not have been possible 
had Romney been forced to air these ads himself. It is important to remember that, 
given non-coordination requirements, Romney could not have legally stopped or 
modified these attack ads even if he had wished to do so.  
By the 2012 campaign, independent spending had come to be a shield for a 
certain form of questionable attack ads. But the use of independent spending has 
been changing since that time. One change has been the entrance of independent 
spending into state and local elections, for judges, state legislators, governors and 
other state offices.31 
                                                           
 29 Darrell West is the Vice President and Director of Governance Studies at the Brookings 
Institution. 
 30 Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Ad Men Have Long History of Republican Attack Politics, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/super-pac-ads-mitt-romney-rick-
santorum_n_1314880.html. 
 31 See Kotch, supra note 19. In North Carolina, for example, independent spending by 
outside groups on legislative races grew from $2.97 million in 2012 to $8.23 million in 2014. 
Id. 
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The importance of this change is that, as opposed to the typically tight 
connections between presidential candidates and the groups that raise and spend 
independent money—so that the messages and themes of the independent groups 
likely mirror those of the candidate—national independent spending can crowd out 
the themes and issues that local candidates wish to emphasize and run on. For 
example, if the National Resources Defense Council and the American Petroleum 
Institute begin running ads in state legislative races, the pressure will grow on 
candidates in those races to address the reality and importance of global warming, 
even though the candidates in these races might have little interest in discussing that 
issue. If the same money were contributed to the candidates’ campaigns instead, the 
election campaign itself would not be taken away from the candidates. 
A second change in independent spending that is noticeable in the 2016 
presidential campaign is the uses of independent spending are growing. No longer 
does such money only run ad campaigns. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton plans to use a Super PAC as a rapid response resource, even coordinating 
with the group under the so-called “Internet exemption.”32 The Associated Press 
reported in April that Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush plans to turn over 
to a Super PAC, “many of the duties typically conducted by a campaign.”33 And, the 
New York Times reported in July 2015, that field operations preparing for the Iowa 
caucuses were being run by Super PACs rather than by certain campaigns.34 It is not 
really known how all this can be done within the restrictions of non-coordination. 
III. THE UNIQUE THREAT THAT INDEPENDENT SPENDING POSES TO AMERICAN 
POLITICAL LIFE 
We come now to the heart of the disagreement between Professor Lessig and me. 
From my perspective, the issue that must be addressed is independent political 
spending. For Professor Lessig, in contrast, the basic problem of American political 
life is that the dependence of candidates for office on campaign contributions from 
wealthy donors leads to a system that caters to donors’ interests. Professor Lessig 
asserts that this would remain the basic problem even if independent spending were 
replaced by direct campaign contributions. According to Professor Lessig, wealthy 
individuals and corporations decide who gets to be taken seriously as a candidate and 
what issues ultimately get addressed in government decision-making. 
                                                           
 32 Matea Gold, How a Super PAC Plans to Coordinate Directly with Hillary Clinton’s 
Campaign, WASH. POST (May 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2015/05/12/how-a-super-pac-plans-to-coordinate-directly-with-hillary-clintons-
campaign. The Internet exemption refers to “a 2006 Federal Election Commission regulation 
that declared that content posted online for free, such as blogs, is off limits from regulation.” 
Id. 
 33 Thomas Beaumont, Jeb Bush Prepares to Give Traditional Campaign a Makeover, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 21, 2015, 6:19 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/409837aa09ee405493ad64a94b8c2c3d/bush-preparing-delegate-
many-campaign-tasks-super-pac.  
 34 See Trip Gabriel, ‘Super PACs’ Take on New Role, Organizing Voters, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/politics/super-pacs-take-on-new-role-
organizing-voters.html?_r=0. The campaigns listed were those of Senator Rand Paul of 
Kentucky and Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana. Id. 
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Despite our differences, I do not deny that politics in America favors the rich, 
whether overall, or in terms of the sorts of particular issues that Professor Lessig sets 
forth in his book.35 One need only consider the matter of the Reagan cut in marginal 
federal income tax rates in 1986. Much of the problem of income inequality in 
America could be addressed by simply reversing that tax cut and returning to the tax 
rates of the 1950s, which was a golden era for economic growth and for a stable and 
widespread American middle class.36 Despite the fact that most people would benefit 
from this change, it can be predicted with certainty that reversing the Reagan tax cut 
will not be raised as an issue in the coming presidential campaign. Professor Lessig 
would no doubt view this as self-evident proof of his position. 
The important question to ask, however, is why most political candidates do not 
discuss the fundamental issue of income inequality? Professor Lessig would assert 
that the reason is structural: in a privatized campaign system, candidates for office 
need contributions and those contributions can only come, as a practical matter, from 
the tiny portion of the electorate that disproportionately benefit from low tax rates. 
While this is so, Professor Lessig’s answer does not tell the whole story. In fact, 
the need for wealthy donors is a relatively minor part of the reason that low tax rates 
are not generally challenged on the campaign trail. In America, low tax rates are 
genuinely popular, and candidates who run on the platform of raising taxes usually 
enjoy little electoral support. Whether one treats this phenomenon as a function of 
Marxist false consciousness, or prejudice against the poor and people of color, or as 
a function of something else—a phenomenon encapsulated in the book What’s the 
Matter with Kansas,37 which highlighted the failure of Americans to vote their 
apparent material interests—is a political, not a structural, matter. In other words, in 
America, candidates for office favor the interests of the wealthy not to get money, or 
not only to get money, but to get votes.38 Thus, it is not structure, but politics, that 
favors the rich.     
                                                           
 35 See LESSIG, supra note 2. Professor Lessig calls these particular issues, such as why we 
do not have free markets, “tells.” Id. at 41. 
 36 This point is made about reversing the parallel tax cuts by Margaret Thatcher in 
Anthony B. Atkinson’s recent book, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? (2015). Thomas 
Piketty’s review of Atkinson’s book alerted me to this one simple action. See Thomas Piketty, 
A Practical Vision of a More Equal Society, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jun/25/practical-vision-more-equal-society. It 
was Piketty who made the point that the same analysis applies to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
which cut the upper tax rate in the United States to twenty-eight percent. Id. President Reagan 
had previously overseen a reduction in the top marginal tax rate from seventy percent to fifty 
percent. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 180-83 (2015). 
Atkinson has a much more radical and innovative plan for change than just raising tax rates. 
See id. at 237-39.  
 37 THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE 
HEART OF AMERICA (2004). 
 38 On more specialized issues, like banking regulation, which are the sorts of issues that 
Professor Lessig highlights in his book, there may be more substance to Professor Lessig’s 
analysis. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 80-81. But, those particular issues pale in significance 
compared to the real power of money to govern the overall shape of political life. And that 
real power is genuinely popular. 
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Even considering just the money itself, as Professor Lessig wants to do, does not 
remove the money from the politics. While candidates and office holders feel 
dependent on money and do respond to its donors, a lot of that money, maybe most 
of it, also represents the political commitments of ordinary people, even if the money 
is actually donated by rich people. This is certainly true of anti-gun control money, 
environmental money, and pro-Israel money. Serving those interests is not just 
catering to the source of the funds, but also to the millions of people who agree with 
the contributors. This is also true of pro-market, global warming skepticism money, 
even if the source of that money is the oil and gas industry. The influence of money 
does not trump politics. Money is a part of politics.39 
The political aspect of money, which is always present, increases when the 
money is contributed to candidates directly, as opposed to being spent 
independently. When this money goes to candidates in the form of contributions, the 
money remains within traditional political considerations. Its impact there must at 
least compete with a candidate’s larger political goals and commitments.40   
The interrelationship between money and political influence is basically 
overlooked in Professor Lessig’s analysis, which claims that the problem is always 
money, plain and simple. A dramatic example of Professor Lessig’s one-sidedness in 
this regard, is what he refers to as “Tweedism.” Our system is not democratic, 
Professor Lessig argues. Yes, voters cast votes, but money interests decide who gets 
to run, in a fashion similar to the Chinese government’s proposal to have a hand-
picked committee select the candidates for political office in Hong Kong, and 
afterwards allow a popular vote to select the office holders. The citizens of Hong 
Kong rightly protested against this proposal, but it is in effect our system, claims 
Professor Lessig.41 
                                                           
 39 I saw the truth of this claim of the interconnection of money and politics illustrated 
dramatically in my hometown newspaper, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, on Monday, July 27, 
2015. Reporter Rich Lord carefully traced the campaign contributions to Governor Tom 
Corbett that helped the natural gas industry stave off a severance tax during the Corbett 
administration. Rich Lord, How Pennsylvania Gas Industry Gained Corbett Influence, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE (July 27, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/news/state/2015/07/27/How-gas-industry-gained-Corbett-
influence/stories/201507270009. But, on that same day, an op-ed by Jim Kunz, a business 
manager for a union employed in the natural gas industry, appeared in the paper arguing that a 
proposed severance tax would cost Pennsylvania jobs. Jim Kuntz, Don’t Kill Our 
Pennsylvania Shale Jobs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (July 27, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/2015/07/27/Don-t-kill-our-Pennsylvania-shale-
jobs/stories/201507270019. Obviously, Mr. Kunz was not planning to give money to the 
readers of the op-ed, but was trying to convince them of a preferred policy outcome. 
 40 See J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance 
Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1120-21 (2010) (finding that in a system of direct 
contributions, “political money would be channeled to political actors who would still be 
constrained in their campaign practices as a result of public disclosure requirements and 
ultimate accountability at the ballot box”). 
 41 See Lawrence Lessig, We Should Be Protesting, Too, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2014, 
5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/we-should-be-protesting-
too_b_5917486.html (explaining the Tweedism analogy as deriving from Boss Tweed in New 
York City). 
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Again, as is the case with the influence of money generally, there is some truth to 
Professor Lessig’s claim about candidate selection. Former United States Senator 
Jim Webb, who announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for 
President on Friday July 2, 2015, decried his inability to raise the huge sums of 
money necessary to be taken seriously.42 To the same effect, the ability to raise 
enormous sums is certainly a key component to Jeb Bush’s campaign strategy.43  
But, one can point conversely to the example of Wisconsin Governor Scott 
Walker to show that money is secondary to politics. Walker did not begin the 
presidential campaign with notable access to big money. It was his grass roots 
performance in Iowa that gave him national standing and the access to money that he 
later enjoyed.44 Of course, Governor Walker’s anti-union message is congenial to big 
money. So, money is not irrelevant. But, that anti-union message is also congenial to 
the Republican voters of Iowa, as well as doubtlessly representing Governor 
Walker’s own sincere beliefs.45 
                                                           
 42 Maggie Haberman & Alan Rappeport, Jim Webb Announces Democratic Bid for 
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/politics/jim-
webb-presidential-campaign.html. Webb wrote in his announcement on his website, “I 
understand the odds, particularly in today’s political climate, where fair debate is so often 
drowned out by huge sums of money.” JIM WEBB ‘16, http://www.webb2016.com/jim-webb-
announces-candidacy-for-president (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
 43 See Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Jeb’s Smooth Money Machine, POLITICO (June 15, 
2015, 5:11 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/jeb-bush-2016-fundraising-money-
campaign-118950.html#ixzz3g4wOpcYf. (“The full-court press is a key component of his 
campaign strategy to shut out potential rivals from megadonors, cement himself as the 
Republican establishment candidate and create the most ambitious presidential fundraising 
operation in history—all before even announcing his White House bid.”). 
 44 See Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin, Scott Walker’s Hard Right Turn in Iowa 
May Hurt Him Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/politics/scott-walkers-hard-right-turn-in-iowa-may-
hurt-him-elsewhere.html?ref=todayspaper. For example, the New York Times described his 
rise in July 2015: “Breakout performances on the stump in Iowa early this year vaulted Mr. 
Walker, who is expected to officially enter the presidential race this month, into the lead in 
polls in the state with the nation’s first nominating contest, and cemented him among the top 
three Republican contenders in most national surveys.” Id. 
 45 See Robert Samuels, Walker’s Anti-Union Law Has Labor Reeling in Wisconsin, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-wisconsin-walkers-anti-
union-law-has-crippled-labor-movement/2015/02/22/1eb3ef82-b6f1-11e4-aa05-
1ce812b3fdd2_story.html. Governor Walker's abrupt exit from the presidential race on 
September 21, 2015, also shows that money is not the deciding factor in the ongoing 
Republican presidential campaign. Governor Walker was undone by the preference of 
Republican voters for an outsider. See Steve Peoples & Julie Pace, Ranks Thinning, 
Traditional GOP Candidates Try to Adapt, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:22 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/433ce669798c4aec9bc7dce88c5a1ced/ranks-thinning-traditional-
gop-candidates-try-adapt. Governor Walker was also undone by his own mistakes. See James 
Downie, The One Thing We Know After Scott Walker's Early Exit, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/09/22/the-one-thing-we-
know-after-scott-walkers-early-exit. His campaign ran out of money only after his political 
support began to disappear. In fact, at the time of his withdrawal, the Super PAC supporting 
him still “was relatively flush with cash.” Nicholas Confessore, Demise of Scott Walker’s 
2016 Bid Shows Limits of ‘Super PACs,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), 
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The same dominance of politics over money is true of Jim Webb’s problem 
overcoming Hillary Clinton’s lead in the race for the Democratic nomination for 
President, or that of other Democratic candidates, such as Vermont Senator Bernie 
Sanders. Certainly, Clinton has more money, and access to even more money in the 
future, than does any other Democrat. But, Clinton’s overwhelming lead has much 
more to do with her standing with African-Americans, women, and other key 
portions of the Democratic Party coalition, than it does with her lead in 
fundraising.46   
If we go further back in time, the nomination of Barack Obama over Hillary 
Clinton in 2008 is another example of political attraction overcoming a lead in 
fundraising. Eventually, candidate Obama became a potent fundraiser. His 
fundraising success, however, came after he created political support for his 
nomination.47 The foregoing demonstrates that Professor Lessig’s Hong Kong 
analogy is exaggerated. The rich do not select our candidates. They do have an 
outsized influence, but they do not select. 
If the influence of money is part of the give and take of the political process, 
rather than a structural weakness, then great attention must be paid to the political 
responsiveness of our system to that disproportionate influence. In other words, if 
issues are addressed in politics primarily because of their popularity, rather than just 
because of the influence of money, and if candidates are selected to run because of 
their political attractiveness, rather than solely because of their lead in fundraising, 
then the influence of money must be addressed in a political, rather than a structural 
way.   
Again, I do not deny that the wealthy have far too much influence for America to 
maintain a healthy democracy. In addition, I do not deny that in detailed decision-
making, in contexts in which the public has trouble discerning what is going on—as 
in bank regulation, for example—public opinion is often ignored in favor of the 
interests of wealth. But the way to deal with this phenomenon is to engage the public 
in the issue of banking reform, rather than emphasizing public financing of 
campaigns.    
Independent spending now threatens the political responsiveness of our system 
and will do so much more in the future. Historically, the threat of independent 
spending has been to remove responsibility from a candidate for actions undertaken 
                                                           
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/us/politics/scott-walkers-demise-shows-limits-of-super-
pac-money-model.html.   
 46 See Steve Kornacki, How African-American Votes Could Tip the Scale for Clinton, 
MSNBC (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-african-american-
votes-could-tip-the-scale-clinton; Jeffrey M. Jones, Hillary Clinton Retains Strong Appeal to 
American Women, GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182081/hillary-
clinton-retains-strong-appeal-american-women.aspx; see also Shane Goldmacher, Cash Rich 
Clinton Towers Over the GOP Field, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/hillary-clinton-2016-money-race-214868. 
 47 John Solomon, Obama Takes Lead in Money Raised, WASH. POST (July 2, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/01/AR2007070100381.html. 
Clinton outraised Obama during the first quarter of 2007, but Obama surged into the money 
raising lead in the second quarter. An indication that this was politics producing money and 
not the other way around, is that in that second quarter, “[t]he vast majority of Obama’s 
donors gave in relatively small amounts . . . . The average donation was $202 . . . .” Id. 
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for the candidate or against an opponent, as independent spending shielded George 
Bush and Mitt Romney in the above examples. This makes it difficult for the voters 
to judge the character of the candidate, who can plausibly deny that he is acting 
improperly, or the record of an opponent, who is being savaged by misleading attack 
ads. Even if nothing else were at stake, this effect of political irresponsibility makes 
it imperative that we try to eliminate independent spending. 
Although independent spending in judicial campaigns is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it should also be noted that the Supreme Court opinion that most strongly 
suggests, and criticizes, the relationship between spending and improper influence 
on judges—and thus the case that might be thought most directly to support 
Professor Lessig’s thesis that money per se is the problem—was in fact a case about 
independent spending on unfair attack ads to change a judicial election result. In 
Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., a party who would later seek to overturn a large 
judgment against his company, spent $3 million, not on contributions to the judicial 
candidate who would eventually cast the deciding vote in his favor, but in creating 
ads that helped defeat a sitting justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals.48 Without independent spending, those unfair ads either would never have 
run or the ultimately successful judicial candidate would have had to take 
responsibility for them, which might have cost him the election. Caperton thus 
illustrates not the influence of money in general, but the disastrous effect of 
irresponsible independent spending.  
But there is more to the threat from independent spending than just political 
irresponsibility. Independent spending is now poised to take over whole campaigns 
from the candidates in those elections. Independent spending now threatens the 
autonomy of political campaigns. This is an even more fundamental threat to 
American political life than irresponsibility.    
To see this threat, consider the role an American election plays in public life. 
Because of the American emphasis on the two-party system, American elections 
have represented an opportunity for voters to make a choice between two visions of 
the future, either in terms of a particular issue or in more general terms. The iconic 
model for this understanding of American politics is the series of debates in 1858 
between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas, the two Senate candidates from 
Illinois, over the future of slavery (although at the time the Illinois state legislature 
voted on and selected the state’s senators).49 
Despite all the problems of American political life today—its outlandish hatreds 
and partisan deadlocks—this model of decision between two visions of the future 
has given our system a great deal of dynamism. It has allowed an actual public 
decision to be made in an election, at least in general terms.50 
As independent spending evolves into political parties of its own,51 election 
campaigns could become merely occasions for ongoing debates over issues deemed 
                                                           
 48 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009). 
 49 THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (Rodney O’ Davis & Douglas L. Wilson, eds., 2008). 
 50 Clearly, the American political system does not always—and never completely—live up 
to this ideal of the two party system, but pretty dramatic popular turns have occurred with 
some regularity—for example, the elections of FDR, Ronald Reagan and, for a time, Barack 
Obama. For a contrast between the ideal and the actual, see Joel Rogers, Two Party System: 
Pull the Plug, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
 51 See Drew, supra note 1. 
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important by organized interests, on the left and right. Candidates themselves could 
become a sideshow to the main event of special interest campaigning. In this way, 
independent spending could sever the bond between candidate and voter.  
This is not a theoretical concern. The New York Times reported in July 2015 that 
field operations preparing for the Iowa caucuses were being run by Super PACs 
rather than by the presidential candidates.52 Since these PACs are closely identified 
with the candidates, this is undoubtedly not an instance of genuinely independent 
operations, but probably one in which non-coordination rules are being flouted. 
Nevertheless, there can be no obvious coordination between the Super PAC and the 
campaign. This led the New York Times reporter to make this ominous observation: 
“[T]here are risks to outsourcing a field campaign. Candidates, who are legally 
forbidden to coordinate with super PACs, are in danger of being cut off from their 
most ardent supporters as they head into caucus and primary elections.”53 What kind 
of democracy can there be when candidates are legally prohibited from direct contact 
with supporters? This already is the strange new world of independent spending. 
America has not yet experienced a national campaign truly based on independent 
spending—one in which, for example, the National Resources Defense Council and 
the American Petroleum Institute begin running ads about the reality of global 
warming in state legislative races when the candidates themselves have little interest 
in discussing the issue. The Super PACs in Iowa are close to the campaigns they are 
serving as proxies. But as the interests that spend independently become better 
organized, more sophisticated, and begin to maintain continuing, institutional 
spending structures, it seems that a kind of parallel campaign is likely to evolve. 
One could argue that this kind of private outsourcing of the themes of a political 
campaign would improve democracy by forcing candidates to address important 
issues that both major party candidates would prefer to push under the rug. But, for 
better or worse, American political life has left the selection of issues largely to 
candidates in individual races. America does not even practice the political party 
selection of issues that parliamentary systems favor. Independent spending threatens 
to change the American approach to political elections and we should certainly think 
hard before continuing policies that favor the independent spending that is bringing 
this about.   
As the above discussion shows, there are two different types of independent 
spending. The first, which is what independent spending has been up until this time, 
is the spending in which non-coordination is a fiction. These are, for example, the 
Super PACs organized by candidates themselves. In effect, this money substitutes 
for direct contributions that would violate contribution limits, and allows that money 
to fund questionable campaign activities or even, as in Iowa, to more easily fund 
genuine campaign activities. This kind of “independent” activity is harmful, but 
perhaps not fatal, to democracy.   
But, once the Koch brothers organized Americans for Prosperity as an ongoing 
political force to defend capitalism against misconceptions,54 another form of 
                                                           
 52 See Gabriel, supra note 34. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Kenneth P. Vogel, Koch Brothers Plan $125 Million Spending Spree, POLITICO 
(May 9, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/koch-brothers-americans-for-
prosperity-2014-elections-106520.html. Defending capitalism against misconceptions is how 
the group described its intentions in a memo about the upcoming campaign season. Id. 
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independent spending began to emerge—one in which the independence of the 
spending is real and there is little or no coordination between the spending and the 
campaigns that are being supported. When other groups begin to set up their own 
permanent structures that also mimic campaigns and political parties, the emphasis 
in elections may begin to drift away from candidates to a parallel campaign among 
interest groups.     
Even if this section has convinced the reader that independent spending 
represents a unique threat to American political life, the question remains as to what 
can be done about it, since the Supreme Court has held that such spending is 
constitutionally protected. I turn to that issue in the next section.   
IV. THE PLAN TO STOP INDEPENDENT POLITICAL SPENDING BY ELIMINATING 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects spending by 
individuals and groups to support the election of favored candidates.55 Despite the 
arguments in the previous section that independent spending threatens American 
democracy, the general thrust of these decisions is legally sound. Indeed, if free 
speech does not guarantee that a citizen is free to rent a billboard at any time, with 
the message, for example, “Don’t Vote for Clinton,” without having to get 
permission from a government official or filing an official form, then it is hard to 
imagine what free speech does mean. The Court is also correct to reason that a 
citizen should be free to remain anonymous in independent electoral activity,56 
especially given the current atmosphere, in which the identities of petition circulators 
are posted online, thus exposing people to retaliation.57 Although scale matters, that 
same constitutional protection must also be extended to groups organized to raise 
funds to do the spending. 
But if all this spending is constitutionally protected, how can there be a plan to 
stop it? While even constitutional protections can be overcome by sufficiently 
compelling government interests, the Court has, until now, rejected corruption as a 
sufficient interest in the context of independent spending.58 Despite Professor 
Lessig’s attempts at proposing a redefinition of corruption, and despite his 
                                                           
 55 This is the key holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam), and 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19, 370-71 (2010). 
 56 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding the state 
prohibition against the distribution of anonymous political literature as unconstitutional). In 
McIntyre, the Court distinguished the disclosure requirements upheld in Buckley. Id. at 353-
57.    
 57 See Sean McMahon, Note, Deregulate But Still Disclose? Disclosure Requirements for 
Ballot Question Advocacy After Citizens United v. FEC and Doe v. Reed, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
733, 734 (2013) (“Prop 8 Maps, a website that takes the publicly disclosed names and 
addresses of financial supporters of California’s Proposition 8 against gay marriage and 
overlays them on an accessible Google map, has been blamed for facilitating death threats and 
other harassment against Proposition 8 backers.”). This is the sort of concern that led Justice 
Alito to concur in Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010), arguing that even if disclosure 
requirements in referendums are facially constitutional, individuals may bring as applied 
challenges alleging that disclosure in a particular instance will expose them to retaliation. Id. 
at 203 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 58 See supra Parts I and II. 
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confidence in Justice Kagan’s powers of persuasion in moving the Court toward 
recognition of new forms of corruption as justifying government regulation of 
political spending, there is no indication that there will be a change in this case law 
any time soon.59 Therefore, for now, any effort to regulate independent spending by 
restricting it in amount or timing, and perhaps even in requiring non-corporate 
transparency in financial sources,60 is likely to be found unconstitutional. 
However, there is a way other than government regulation to eliminate 
independent spending, or at least reduce its size and impact. That way is simply to 
end campaign contribution limits. While calls for the end of contribution limits have 
been made from time to time, those proposals have usually been grounded in First 
Amendment considerations.61 But now, the threat from independent spending has 
become so serious that the elimination of contribution limits needs to be 
reconsidered as a means to protect democracy, whatever view one takes of the First 
Amendment status of contributions limits.62 The rest of this section argues that 
contribution limits, whatever their merits, are not worth their effect in creating and 
sustaining independent political spending. 
In considering the elimination of contribution limits, three questions must be 
considered. First, would eliminating contribution limits actually stop independent 
spending? Second, would the tradeoff be worth it—that is, even if eliminating 
contribution limits would end independent spending, would the resulting regime of 
unlimited direct campaign contributions be worse than the current campaign finance 
system? Third, is the elimination of contribution limits politically feasible? 
A. Eliminating Contribution Limits Will Stop Independent Spending 
As to the first question, there are some anecdotal indications that eliminating 
campaign contributions would end independent spending. After all, independent 
spending as an organized phenomenon did not exist before contribution limits and 
non-coordination requirements were introduced in the 1970s. In one large, 
unintended experiment, California’s adoption of state and local contribution limits in 
2001 does seem to have stimulated the growth of independent spending to its current 
massive levels in that state.63 
                                                           
 59 The per curiam decision in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 
2491 (2012), striking down Montana's regulation of independent corporate political spending 
and the decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434-37 (2014), striking down 
aggregate contribution limits, suggest that the Court has not moved any since Citizens United 
was decided.   
 60 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United upheld disclosure requirements 
in the context of corporate speech, but held open the possibility of as applied challenges when 
the potential for retaliation that would chill speech can be shown. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
368-71. 
 61 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 663, 664 (1997); Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the 
First Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America's Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 27, 49 (2006) (“free speech purists call for the overturning of Buckley . . . .”). 
 62 There have been proposals to eliminate contribution limits along the lines set forth here, 
as well. See Abraham, supra note 40. 
 63 Jim Miller, Independent Spending in California’s Statewide, Legislative Races the 
Highest in Years, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 1, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
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Aside from empirical indications, reasonable speculation about what would 
happen were contribution limits ended suggests why independent spending would 
end or decline. First, without contribution limits, the legal structure of non-
coordination would have to be rescinded. Non-coordination only exists as a way to 
prevent contributions to campaigns that exceed contribution limits. Without that 
justification, non-coordination is a pointless restriction on core political speech.64 So, 
once contribution limits are eliminated, non-coordination will necessarily be 
repealed or struck down. 
In the absence of non-coordination requirements, voters could demand that 
candidates rein in the excesses of their supporters, for example, the airing of 
irresponsible attack ads. Unlike the current structure of legally enforced 
irresponsibility, a candidate’s refusal or failure to assert control over all attack ads 
launched for his or her benefit in a regime without non-coordination would lead to 
the loss of electoral support. The inability or unwillingness of the candidate to 
control supporters would be regarded as a failure of leadership. 
Furthermore, once the advantage of irresponsibility was lost, candidates would 
demand that contributions to independent Super PACs simply be contributed instead 
to the candidate’s own campaign. The current trend to fund campaign activities 
through independent spending referred to above is mostly just a way of avoiding 
existing contribution limits. Without those limits, the complex structure currently 
evolving would be unnecessary. Thus, independent groups, like Americans for 
Prosperity, would quickly be forced to contribute directly to campaigns rather than 
undertake independent activities65 for fear of alienating the very candidates they 
purport to support. Eventually, candidates would just obtain the original 
contributions themselves and would not need independent groups at all. 
Even the problem of dark money would disappear without campaign contribution 
limits. Without non-coordination requirements, the media and voters could ask 
candidates to fully identify financial sources when they receive campaign 
contributions from groups. Of course, a candidate could make a principled First 
Amendment argument that anonymity should be respected, but the voters might not 
be impressed by that position. Even if the candidate were to return dark money 
contributions, any resulting independent spending of that money would still be 
regarded as the candidate’s responsibility. 
While there cannot be certainty that eliminating contribution limits will diminish 
independent spending, a natural experiment that Pennsylvania conducted during the 
2015 campaign season may help determine whether there would be such an effect. 
Because of retirement, resignation under fire, and criminal conviction, Pennsylvania, 
                                                           
government/election/article2600258.html#storylink=cpy (“Such spending has been a fixture 
of California races since 2001, following voters’ approval of contribution limits for 
candidates. The independent groups can accept unlimited amounts from deep-pocketed donors 
but cannot legally coordinate with the campaigns of candidates they support.”). 
 64 See Justin B. Uhlemann, Comment, Constitutional Law: The Not So Narrow Tailoring 
of State Limits on Campaign Contributions, 53 FLA. L. REV. 183, 185 (2001) (stating that the 
Buckley Court regarded contribution limits as infringing on fundamental right of political 
association and only upheld them under exacting scrutiny). 
 65 Current restrictions on Super PACs' contributions to campaigns would also be relaxed 
or eliminated once contribution limits are ended. Without contribution limits, they also would 
serve no purpose. 
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which holds partisan judicial elections, elected three justices to its seven-member 
Supreme Court.66 That large number means that partisan and ideological control of 
the court is at stake. Perhaps because Pennsylvania does not have contribution limits 
in judicial elections, independent spending has not been an issue in previous judicial 
campaigns. But, such an extraordinary potential prize raised fears that organized 
interests—business, union, environmental—might flood the airwaves with judicial 
attack ads during this particular judicial election. 
In an attempt to forestall this possibility in the general election, I wrote an op-ed 
the day of the primary election that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer and online, 
calling on the six winners to forego any independent spending on their behalf by 
formally asking their supporters to make direct campaign contributions instead.67 So 
far, this effort has not worked, as the candidates have stated that they do not intend 
to interfere with how people wish to spend their money. But this evasion of 
responsibility by the judicial candidates may not last once the voters begin to pay 
attention to the matter in the fall. In any event, even having to respond demonstrates 
that the absence of contribution limits can have an effect on independent spending. 
I doubt that the speculations above will be particularly controversial. When I put 
the question of the effect of eliminating contribution limits to noted campaign 
finance expert Joseph Fishkin, at the Association of American Law Schools program 
on campaign finance reform in January 2015,68 he did not deny that such a change 
would transfer independent spending to campaign spending.69 In fact, Professor 
Fishkin was skeptical of proposals to eliminate contribution limits combined with 
disclosure requirements, because, he said, it would simply transfer the current 
excesses of independent fundraising and spending—its responsiveness to only a few 
large donors—to candidates and political parties.70 In contrast, campaigns now are at 
least partly still volunteer affairs and politically responsive, which would end once 
candidates became, in effect, Super PACs. Professor Fishkin did not doubt that 
eliminating contribution limits would transform independent spending into campaign 
spending, which raises the second question regarding whether there would be any 
gain from eliminating contribution limits.71   
                                                           
 66 See Chris Potter, Three Open Seats on PA Supreme Court Make for Pivotal Races, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE (May 3, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-
state/2015/05/03/Three-open-seats-on-PA-Supreme-Court-make-for-pivotal-
races/stories/201505310002; see also Eric Holmberg, What You Need to Know About the PA 
Supreme Court Race, PUBLICSOURCE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2015), http://publicsource.org/from-the-
source/what-you-need-know-about-pa-supreme-court-race#.Vj-zirSTr8E. 
 67 See Bruce Ledewitz, Court Candidates, Pledge to Limit Campaign Donations, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (May 18, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/thinktank/Court-
candidates-pledge-to-limit-campaign-donations.html. 
 68 Professor Joseph Fishkin, Citizens Invited: Scholars and Professors in the Campaign 
Finance Wars, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS. (Jan. 4, 2015), https://soundcloud.com/aals-2/hot-
topic-bridge-citizens-invited/s-pMWR3. 
 69 Id. My question was put at around 4:34 PM and Professor Fishkin responds around 
thirty-six minutes into the program.   
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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B. Eliminating Contribution Limits Will Prevent Campaign Corruption by Allowing 
Candidates to Once Again Control the Campaign 
Assuming that eliminating contribution limits were to greatly restrict independent 
spending, would such a change just corrupt candidates as much, or even more, than 
the current system? One way to think about answering this question is to consider 
whether independent spending is more harmful to democracy than spending by 
candidates. Of course, the prior section attempted to show that it is. If that is the 
case, then the tradeoff of substituting campaign contributions for independent 
spending would be worth it even if nothing else were to change.  In a world without 
contribution limits, and without a ban on coordination, candidates and political 
parties would receive and spend most of the money raised and spent on political 
campaigns. This would result in more politically responsible campaigns, with fewer 
blatantly unfair attack ads, and would focus voter attention away from the interests 
favored by economically powerful interest groups and toward issues that candidates 
determined should be the focus of the campaign. 
But the benefits of ending contribution limits might go beyond just shifting the 
same amount of money from independent spending to direct campaign contributions. 
In a world without contribution limits, candidates and voters would likely insist that 
money go to the candidates themselves, who would then be responsible for how the 
money was spent. In this world, the egos of rich individuals, who now receive 
attention and satisfaction from changing the course of a campaign through their 
independent activities, would be relegated to mere contributors among many other 
contributors. Perhaps in this new world, there would be less incentive to contribute 
at all. It is possible, then, that less money, or at least fewer large donations, would be 
spent on campaigns overall after contribution limits were eliminated. 
What, then, about the effect on candidates that Professor Fishkin predicts? Would 
this not be worse than the current system? The answer to that question is plainly, no. 
The new system would be an improvement. For one thing, this fear of the effect of 
campaign contributions on candidates ignores the fact that candidates raise money 
now. Even candidates who benefit the most from independent spending cannot 
entirely rely on it. Candidates are already money machines even without taking into 
account the new phenomenon of non-declared candidates raising Super PAC 
money—without contribution limits—and only then formally declaring.72  
In addition, candidates are inefficient money machines. Part of the reason that 
candidates spend so much time on fundraising is contribution limits.73 Super PACs 
do not have to constantly fundraise because they can accept large contributions. So, 
if a candidate is willing to absorb the political heat from receiving a couple of 
million dollar checks that will fund an entire campaign, they should be permitted to 
do so. Undoubtedly, in response, the opponents of such candidates will then pledge 
to limit contributions to a relatively small amount. The voters can then choose which 
approach they prefer. 
                                                           
 72 This was the tactic utilized by Jeb Bush in the spring of 2015. See Andrew Prokop, Jeb 
Bush is Stretching the Limits of Campaign Finance Law, VOX (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/6/8354331/jeb-bush-fundraising.   
 73 See Vincent Blasi, Spending Limits and the Squandering of Candidates' Time, 6 J.L. & 
POL'Y 123, 124 (1997). 
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In addition, eliminating contribution limits would eliminate the noxious role of 
the bundler. These are individuals who get around contribution limits by bringing a 
bunch of individual contributions to a candidate in one fell swoop, thus skirting even 
existing campaign finance regulations.74 At least the influence of these individuals 
would be lessened in the world of unrestricted contributions. 
There are other potential advantages from the elimination of contribution limits. 
In terms of grass roots campaigns, the law of contribution limits is part of the 
complexity of election law that helps keep outsiders from running. If people could 
give any amount of money, record-keeping requirements could be simplified. In 
addition, while independent spending can be uniquely valuable to a candidate—for 
the reasons explained above—all contributions are of the same value per dollar 
contributed. So, candidates will be less obligated to special interests if support takes 
the form of contributions rather than independent spending. It may even be that 
opposing interests will be encouraged to make contributions to the same candidates, 
thus offsetting the influence of one side in a controversy. This is harder to do when 
independent spending takes place. 
Granted, Americans assume that personal solicitation of contributions by a 
candidate creates a unique context for influence on that candidate. It was in part just 
such a concern that led the Supreme Court to permit restrictions on personal 
solicitations by judicial candidates even when independent spending on behalf of 
judicial candidates was not restricted in any way.75 But whatever validity there may 
be in this intuition with regard to the problem of quid pro quo corruption—or, in the 
case of a judge, the loss of faith in an impartial judiciary—there is no reason to 
assume that office holders are generally more responsive to the issue orientation of 
contributors to them than they are to independent spending on their behalf.      
Furthermore, responsiveness by a non-judicial office holder to the issue concerns 
of contributors is quite different from the fear that judges will be influenced by 
contributions in their decision-making. For example, if a candidate for legislative 
office is elected with the monetary and electoral support of pro-life or pro-choice 
voters, it is not any form of democratic deformation for that office holder to respond 
to the concerns of those voters and contributors when voting on abortion related 
issues. Indeed, that is exactly what we expect an office holder to do. It is only in the 
case of a judge that we would regard any form of responsiveness in decision-making 
to a contributor to be threatening to the value of the rule of law. Even in the case of a 
judge, however, there is reason to doubt that personal solicitation is more threatening 
than independent spending. The reader should remember that in the only case in 
                                                           
 74 See Michael Gentithes, An Aggregated Threat: Campaign Contribution "Bundling" and 
the Future of Reform, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2012). "The rapidly-growing 
modern practice of campaign finance 'bundling' allows a single powerful donor to stockpile 
innumerable individual contributions and deliver them in one package to a candidate for use 
entirely at that candidate's discretion. Often, such bundled contributions are a farcical front for 
the donor's personal effort to fund a candidate well beyond existing contribution ceilings, 
earning the bundler special notoriety and inside access during an ongoing campaign." Id. 
 75 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). The failure of the 
government to attempt to limit independent spending on behalf of judicial candidates was one 
ground for Justice Scalia’s dissent in the case. See id. at 1679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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which political activity led the Supreme Court to order recusal, the activity was not 
campaign contributions but independent spending.76     
C. Eliminating Contribution Limits is a Feasible and Constitutional Solution 
The political reason that contribution limits could so easily be abolished is that 
many Republicans and conservatives are already of the view that contribution limits 
at least threaten, if not violate, First Amendment values. This was the point of the 
Chief Justice Burger's partial dissent in Buckley.77 For this reason, any general 
attempt to eliminate contribution limits, whether at a state or national level, would 
receive overwhelming Republican support.78 This leaves Democrats and liberals, 
many of whom, like Professor Lessig, do not believe that contribution limits violate 
the First Amendment. So, contribution limits would be repealed tomorrow if even a 
portion of this latter group became convinced that there were reasons other than the 
First Amendment for repeal of contribution limits. 
The purpose of this Article is, in large part, to change the view of eliminating 
contribution limits by some of those in the liberal camp. Until now, any argument 
about contribution limits has centered around the meaning of free speech. I have 
purposely avoided such constitutional considerations here. My goal is to raise the 
issue of independent political spending as a serious problem aside from general 
considerations of the influence of money in politics. Then, hopefully, people will 
consider the elimination of contribution limits not just as a constitutional issue, but 
also as a way of curbing the power of independent spending.   
We are not helpless to do something while the Koch brothers on the right and all 
sorts of individuals and groups on the left create shadow campaigns and parallel 
campaigns that engage in harmful activities and eclipse genuine democracy. We can 
break the current deadlock around this problem. In fact, if Professor Lessig endorsed 
the change, given his influence among Americans who are worried about the 
political influence of money, contribution limits would very likely be quickly 
eliminated. 
However, treating contribution limits and independent spending as separate from 
all other efforts of campaign finance reform is not a realistic way of framing the 
issue. Professor Lessig has been promoting a much larger effort toward campaign 
finance reconceptualization. Before asking him and his supporters to join an effort to 
eliminate contribution limits, the effect of such a repeal on that larger project must 
be addressed. At first glance, one would think that repeal of contribution limits 
would have a negative effect on Professor Lessig's larger effort. In the next section, I 
hope to show, instead, that eliminating contribution limits is actually a necessary 
first step toward enacting any more general campaign finance reform.  
                                                           
 76 See Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873, 879-90 (2009). 
 77 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241-46 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 78 This is not pure speculation. Actual attempts to eliminate contribution limits at the state 
level have generated patterns of support and opposition very much along party lines. See, for 
example, the experience in West Virginia, Joel Ebert, Bill to Remove Political Contribution 
Limits Sent to Subcommittee, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.charlestondailymail.com/article/20150225/DM01/150229574.  
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 V. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ELIMINATING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS TO PROFESSOR 
LESSIG’S REFORM PLAN  
Independent spending is a major impediment to the enactment of Professor 
Lessig’s campaign finance reform program. To see this, consider Professor Lessig’s 
major proposal: public financing of elections, either by a voucher system or by direct 
public financing, to reduce the influence of private money in political affairs, in 
favor of what he calls dependence on the people.79 
Independent spending is already reducing the impact of one form of public 
financing currently in place—public financing of the election campaign for 
President.80 Imagine a Republican candidate for President who proposed, after the 
party nominating convention, that both major party candidates for President forswear 
private campaign contributions in favor of public financing in the general election. 
This would be a reasonable proposal since each candidate would have the same 
amount of money to spend81—in 2012, each major party general election candidate 
for President was eligible to receive $91.2 million in public funds82—and for all the 
reasons Professor Lessig has highlighted in his writings and speaking, the public 
would be in favor of this proposal. 
Yet, as things now stand, no Democratic candidate for President could 
responsibly agree to this proposal. With the independent spending structures now in 
place, the Democratic Party presidential candidate would be overwhelmed by 
independently funded attack ads and non-coordination rules would prevent the 
Republican candidate from stopping these independent efforts, even if the will to do 
so were present. While groups would raise independent money on behalf of the 
Democratic nominee as well, this would not change the negative calculation. 
Democrats have never been able to match independent spending by Republican Party 
supporters. Regardless, no presidential candidate would hand over the future of her 
campaign to outsiders. 
At the moment, the First Amendment would prevent any restriction on the 
amount of money independently raised and spent on behalf of the Republican 
candidate in my scenario. Even if this constitutional interpretation were to change 
                                                           
 79 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 265-72 
 80 In 2008, Democrat Barack Obama was the first major party candidate to reject public 
financing for the general election. Independent spending is one of the factors that has led 
presidential candidates to abandon the public financing system. See Tarini Parti, Will 2012 Be 
the End of the Presidential Public Financing System?, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/08/the-end-of-presidential-public-financing. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, “No major candidate accepted public funds 
in 2012.” R. Sam Garrett, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential 
Campaigns, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41604.pdf.   
 81 See Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml#Expenditure_Limits. Public financing 
requires that the candidate forswear additional fundraising and spending during the general 
election: “A major party nominee who has accepted public funding for the general election 
may not accept any contributions to further his election.” Id. Campaign spending limits apply 
to acceptance of matching public funds during the primary campaign. Id.    
 82 Quick Answers to Public Funding Questions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_public_funding.shtml#howmuchmoneydotheyget (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2016). The amounts are adjusted for cost of living. 
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that would just cause the negative attack ads to become negative issue ads. The 
Democratic nominee would have to respond to ads such as “The Iranian deal will 
give Iran the bomb” or “Obamacare has been a failure.” No conceivable 
interpretation of the First Amendment could prevent negative discussion of the 
issues during an election campaign. So, no Democratic nominee for President could 
agree to public financing. Thus, independent spending has already been an important 
factor in the nonuse of public funding by presidential candidates.   
Similar scenarios can be imagined in local government campaigns. Today, local 
governments, under the influence of Professor Lessig’s reform program, are 
considering public election funding.83 But, as independent groups discover the power 
of independent spending at the local level, these public funding efforts may also be 
overwhelmed and thus abandoned. One can easily imagine restaurant and retail 
groups running independent attack ads against incumbent city council members in 
every city in which the minimum wage has been raised. Under most public financing 
rules, these incumbents would not be able to raise concomitant amounts of money to 
respond to such attacks. 
Imagine now a world without contribution limits. In this world, independent 
spending has gradually dried up as candidates and political parties have insisted that 
they control the planning and spending in campaigns. The abolition of non-
coordination restrictions has also enabled candidates to discourage spending by 
outside groups. Super PACs have disappeared as candidates have developed their 
own capacities to solicit large scale contributions. Voters have gotten used to 
campaigns totally controlled by candidates.   
In this world, an offer by one presidential candidate to the other that they both 
accept public financing could at least be considered. It would not be political suicide 
to accept such an offer. This is one way that eliminating contribution limits can serve 
the accomplishment of Professor Lessig’s overall goals. Yes, in the short run, ending 
contribution limits just further emphasizes private fundraising by candidates. But as 
the above thought experiment shows, eventually, the end of contribution limits could 
serve to strengthen the potential for public financing of elections. 
But all this, of course, is speculation. However, there is one way that ending 
contribution limits immediately serves Professor Lessig’s goals by breaking the 
partisan logjam on political finance reform.   
Many conservatives reject Professor Lessig’s basic analysis of the role of money 
in American political life. For them, given the size of the United States economy, 
relatively little is spent on politics, perhaps not enough.84 In addition, many 
conservatives see the First Amendment as strongly supportive of campaign finance 
that is free of government regulation. For someone who shares Professor Lessig’s 
commitments, there is not very much common ground with such conservatives 
around these questions. Yet, Professor Lessig has also favored nonpartisan 
                                                           
 83 Lessig adverted to these efforts in his presentation during the Symposium. See Lessig, 
supra note 18. 
 84 See Peter Roff, There's Not Enough Money in Political Campaigns, U.S. NEWS REPS. 
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2010/11/16/theres-not-
enough-money-in-political-campaigns.   
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approaches to campaign finance reform and has emphasized the need to find elusive 
common ground.85    
The goal of eliminating contribution limits can serve as just the kind of joint first 
step that Professor Lessig has advocated. Probably both conservatives and liberals 
share the commitment that political campaigns are best run by candidates rather than 
by independent groups, as long as the right of independent groups to participate is 
respected. While conservatives and liberals would not agree on any coercive 
regulations to discourage independent spending, they might be able to agree on a 
non-coercive approach, such as ending contribution limits as a way to curb 
independent spending. If so, ending contribution limits could be the beginning of a 
renewed nonpartisan dialogue about money and politics. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past few years, Professor Lawrence Lessig has convinced millions of 
Americans of the need for campaign finance reform through his persuasive analysis 
of the influence of money in American elections and policy-making. If there is a 
chance that these matters will be addressed, it is largely because of his efforts. 
Nevertheless, the failure of Professor Lessig to address independent political 
spending as a separate issue has hindered his appreciation of the unique harm that 
independent spending poses to democratic life. Independent spending must be 
curbed now, before its corrosive effects undermine American democracy beyond 
repair. Independent spending is worse than the problem of money in politics 
generally. 
Fortunately, independent spending can be curbed without constitutional 
amendment, constitutional convention, or shifting First Amendment analysis. 
Independent political spending is the creation of campaign contribution limits and 
can be curtailed by simply eliminating those restrictions. 
The resulting world of unlimited, large contributions by a small number of 
donors giving directly to candidates may seem very far away from the concerns and 
hopes of Professor Lessig. That impression is misleading. Direct contributions to 
candidates are much more subject to democratic discipline and filtering than is 
independent spending. Because of that, even a dollar-for-dollar shift from 
independent spending to campaign contribution would reduce the influence of 
money in politics. In addition, the plaything of a few wealthy individuals that 
independent spending has made of American politics may be lessened when those 
same individuals contribute money rather than run their own, parallel campaigns. 
Finally, restricting independent spending is one way to reach the ultimate goal of 
robust public financing. It will be far easier to move to public financing in a context 
in which candidates and campaign contributions represent the workings of money in 
our system, as opposed to our current context of independent groups and spending, 
which undermines any hope of a public financing system. Though Professor Lessig 
may not yet agree, the elimination of contribution limits should be high on his 
agenda of campaign finance reform.       
  
 
                                                           
 85 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 335 (“[T]here is critical work to be done now to build 
understanding across the insane political divide that defines politics in America today.”). 
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